|
|
The song "Sailing the Sea Depends on the Helmsman" captures the
essential rhetorical elements of the Mao cult. The first verse reads:
Sailing seas depends on the helmsman,
Life and growth depends on the sun.
Rain and dew nourish the crops,
Making revolution depends on Mao Zedong Thought.
Fish can't leave the water,
Nor melons leave the vines.
The revolutionary masses can't do without the Communist Party.
Mao Zedong Thought is the sun that forever shines.
The song dates from the 1950s and its words already enshrined Mao
Zedong as leader who could steer China in a turbulent world. The
verse, however, also emphasizes that the Communist Party is essential
for China. That approach worked well until after the Great Leap
Forward when Mao felt he was being pushed aside and launched the
Cultural Revolution, attacking his closest subordinates and
destroying the party itself. Daniel Leese's engrossing study of the
Mao cult traces its history and places special attention on the
terminology and rituals praising Mao.
Leese begins by sketching how this cult of Mao's leadership appeared
in China during the war against Japan. In part, this marked the
elevation of Mao as what Leese calls a "brand symbol" of the
Communist movement. Also the cult provided a counterweight to Chinese
Nationalists' elevation of Chiang Kai-shek. Probably of equal
importance is that Mao's writings gave a Chinese identity to
Communism. Praise of Mao's leadership inspired confidence in the
Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authority independent of Stalin and
the Soviet Union. Leese provides an excellent first chapter
interpreting the importance for China of Khrushchev's February 1956
secret speech. By denouncing Stalin's rule, Khrushchev presented a
challenge to Mao's role in China, for if Stalin was at fault, then
Mao also could make mistakes. The CCP's response by Mao and his
fellow leaders reasserted Mao's special role. Leese quotes Deng
Xiaoping at the CCP's Eighth Party Congress in 1958: "Love for the
Leader is essentially an expression of love for the party, the class
and the people, and not the deification of the individual" (p. 48).
Leese's main interest lies in showing how after the Great Leap
Forward (1958-60) the cult blossomed into adulation for Mao Zedong as
a charismatic, all-knowing leader to whom everyone should display
fervent and unquestioning loyalty. Leese draws extensively from the
Hebei provincial archives for material that shows how the cult became
increasing based on Mao's genius independent of the CCP. By the early
1960s Mao's subordinates felt they could no longer rely on Mao to
lead China forward. His response was to strike out at both the
individual leaders and the party apparatus in general. The
consequence was the dismantling of the Leninist rudder by which Mao
steered the ship of state.
Leese pays special attention to the 1966-68 period to show how the
exact phrases glorifying Mao became closely defined during those
years, producing a "peak of language formalization and the
near-merging of public and private speech" (p. 181). The cult
encouraged various rituals, including daily morning and evening
pledges to Mao, loyalty dances, and what Leese calls the bewildering
"episode of worshipping mangos" (p. 223). This refers to nationwide
fascination with mangoes as a symbol of Mao's favor following Mao's
gift of mangos to a propaganda team attempting to reestablish order
at Qinghua University in Beijing in July 1968.
Leese's argument is that such practices represented blind adulation
of Mao as a person and could not translate into a means to guide
practical policy. Rhetoric and ritual proved no substitute for a
disciplined Leninist party. Leese's argument emphasizes the irony of
Mao's belief that he could guide China without a Leninist party. Mao
attempted find something to replace the bureaucratic but effective
structure of the CCP. The Red Guards proved unsatisfactory for they
produced only chaotic conflict among themselves. Then Mao turned to
the enigmatic and reclusive Lin Biao in hopes Lin could use the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a means of control. Leese finds
that Lin could not control the PLA and only managed to develop a
secondary cult of his own leadership. Frightened that his designated
successor might displace him, Mao disposed of Lin. Finally, Mao tried
to use his wife, Jiang Qing, and her coterie of followers. None of
these attempts worked. Without the disciplined Leninist party that
Mao had destroyed, the Chinese ship of state wallowed without
direction.
Leese is careful to note that Mao Zedong himself, as well as many of
his closest supporters both before and during the Cultural
Revolution, disapproved of these rituals and tried repeatedly to
reign in the ever-growing adulation of Mao. It is at this juncture
that Leese's research into the official archives of these years opens
new ground by showing how both Mao and the Chinese Communist Party
leaders continued attempting to assert detailed centralized control
over policy even after they had dismantled the means for exercising
that control. Leese provides several examples. In one, he discusses
how in September 1967 Qi Benyu and Chen Boda, acting on Mao's wishes,
attempted to stop the building of Mao Zedong statues in Tianjin.
Although this was only a minor question in one nearby city during the
increasing chaos brought on by the Cultural Revolution, they failed.
In another, in 1968 many so-called Mao Zedong miracles (p. 192) were
recorded and publicized, especially in medical matters. Mao called
these empty boasts and tried to suppress such claims, but could not.
The Great Helmsman had lost control of the rudder.
The Cultural Revolution had damaged the rudder of Leninism. To work,
the Leninist system needed a centrally based disciplined network
through which it could transmit its orders throughout the society. A
cult of personal leadership can serve to bolster the Leninist party
apparatus. By attacking the CCP, Mao had done away with the essential
element of control. He was left with only a cult and a fragmented
group of followers. His dream for spontaneous action by the masses
was realized, but for control Mao remained dependent on Leninism. He
assumed he could retain control over the details of policy even
though the Cultural Revolution had cut the lines of authority. Again,
Leese provides an example in his discussion of central policy after
the Ninth Party Congress of 1969. Mao issued a set of seven
instructions curbing many standard practices that glorified him. He
was determined to weed out practices that did not meet his approval;
however, the means to achieve compliance--a disciplined Leninist
party--no longer existed.
In his chapter "Curbing the Cult," Leese takes up how the CCP
regained control of the chaos left by the Cultural Revolution. This
is a major question, but Leese's treatment here falls short of the
high standard of his earlier chapters. His account recites the now
familiar story of Lin Biao's fall and the assertion of Deng
Xiaoping's brand of collective leadership. What is missing is the
kind of detailed discussion of clashes over policy that made the
middle chapters of this book so fascinating. Such clashes must have
taken place. That might be the subject of another study.
I can recall several instances during my first visit to the People's
Republic of China in November 1974 that revealed how the cult of Mao
still held sway in China. In Chengzhou our trip leader was made to
write an apology to the Chinese people for insulting Mao Zedong. One
of our delegation had a book whose cover had been seen by workers in
a factory. The cover showed Mao and Chiang Kai-shek's photos as equal
rivals during the war against Japan. Never mind that they were
actually rivals for leadership then, because in 1974 Mao still ranked
as a semi-divine leader beyond comparison with others, particularly
Chiang Kai-shek. We also listened to repeated strong denunciations to
Lin Biao as an adherent of Confucianism. We understood that Lin was
being denounced as a failed successor to Mao, but what in Lin's
background or actions ever hinted that he was a Confucian? These
survivals of the cult of Mao came five years after the hopes to
reconstitute the Chinese Communist Party after the Ninth Party
Congress of 1969. Curbing the cult of Mao has proved a challenge for
China down to today.
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37809 |
|
发表于 2013-11-25 16:54:09